Rocky Linux 9 Kernel Cryptographic API

Certificate

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for Rocky Linux 9 Kernel Cryptographic API
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>update<br/>Recovery</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i>"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel<br/>references (may be KDF<br/>names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IKEV<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I5["Possible only, a protocol<br/>is referenced, but whether<br/>it is a live channel or<br/>only a KDF/algorithm name<br/>is unconfirmed."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R5["If a live TLS/SSH/IKE<br/>channel exists, could<br/>library CVEs apply, or is<br/>this only a<br/>KDF/documentation name?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E5["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>library identity and<br/>version ·<br/>certificate-validation<br/>behaviour · protocol-CVE<br/>disposition"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C5 --> I5 --> R5 --> E5
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I5,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R5,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E5,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for Rocky Linux 9 Kernel Cryptographic API
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>update<br/>Recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>UnAuth</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C5["[low] Protocol / secure-channel references (may be KDF names, not a live channel)<br/><i>IKEV<br/>IPSEC<br/>HTTPS</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>linux<br/>kernel</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C5,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

Ctrl IQ, Inc. Rocky Linux 9 Kernel Cryptographic API Prepared by: atsec information security corporation

4516 Seton Center Pkwy, Suite 250

Austin, TX 78759 Document version: 1.1 www.atsec.com Last update: 2025-12-15 © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version kernel rocky9.20250121; libkcapi-1.3.1-3.el9 of the Rocky Linux 9 Kernel Cryptographic API module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module. intact and including this notice.

In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing.

Table 1: Security Levels © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Purpose and Use: The Rocky Linux 9 Kernel Cryptographic API (hereafter referred to as “the module”) provides a C language application program interface (API) for use by other (kernel space and user space) processes that require cryptographic functionality. The module operates on a generalpurpose computer as part of the Linux kernel. Its cryptographic functionality can be accessed using the Linux Kernel Crypto API. Module Type: Software Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined as the kernel binary and the kernel crypto object files, the libkcapi shared library, and the sha512hmac binary, which is used to verify the integrity of the software components. In addition, the cryptographic boundary contains the .hmac files which store the expected integrity values for each of the software components. Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): The TOEPP of the module is defined as the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed. The PAA provided by the processor is located within the module’s physical perimeter and outside of the module’s cryptographic boundary. The cryptographic boundary and TOEPP are schematically represented in Figure 1. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Identification Tested Module Identification

• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): Table 2: Tested Module Identification
• Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid The module implements Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) for the tested platforms listed above. There is no Processor Algorithm Implementation (PAI). Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: N/A for this module.

There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3 requirements.

Modes List and Description: Table 4: Modes List and Description After passing all pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests executed on startup, the to reach this point. Mode Change Instructions and Status: The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the service that was requested. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 5: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: C.H) Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 8: Security Function Implementations

For IPsec, the module offers the AES-GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 4106. IVs © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

generated using this mechanism may only be used in the context of AES-GCM encryption within the IPsec protocol. The module does not implement IPsec. The module’s implementation of AES GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module’s cryptographic boundary. This application must use RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES-GCM encryption keys are derived. The design of the IPsec protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. In the event the module’s power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES-GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established. The module also provides a non-approved AES-GCM encryption service which accepts arbitrary external IVs from the operator. This service can be requested by invoking the crypto_aead_encrypt API function with an AES-GCM handle. When this is the case, the API will not set an approved service indicator, as described in this document.

The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with AES-XTS shall not exceed 220 AES blocks, that is 16MB, of data per XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in Section 4 of SP 800-38E. The XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. It shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit. To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check to ensure that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical. As the module does not implement symmetric key generation, this check is performed when the keys are input by the operator. Key_1 and Key_2 shall be generated and/or established independently according to the rules for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133r2, Section 6.3.

All supported modulus sizes for RSA signature verification have been CAVP tested.

To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56Ar3, the operator must use the Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation algorithms with the NVMe and Bluetooth related protocols. Additionally, the module’s approved key pair generation service must be used to generate ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key pairs, or the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key. The module’s shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer DH public key, complying with Section 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56Ar3.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Digital signature generation using SHA-1 is non-approved and not allowed in approved services.

The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key transport scheme (KTS). However, it does offer approved authenticated algorithms that can be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KTS.

The module does not establish SSPs using an approved key agreement scheme (KAS). However, it does offer some or all of the underlying KAS cryptographic functionality to be used by an external operator/application as part of an approved KAS.

Table 9: Entropy Certificates Table 10: Entropy Sources The module implements three different Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementations based on SP 800-90Ar1: Counter DRBG, Hash DRBG, and HMAC DRBG. Each of these DRBG implementations can be instantiated by the operator of the module, using the parameters listed specified in the Security Function Implementations table. When instantiated, these DRBGs can be used to generate random numbers for external usage. Additionally, the module employs a specific HMAC-SHA-512 DRBG implementation for internal purposes (e.g. to generate asymmetric key pairs). The module complies with the Public Use Document for ESV certificate E260 by reading entropy data from the jent_kcapi_random() function, which corresponds to the GetEntropy() conceptual interface. This function outputs 256 bits of full entropy. The HMAC-SHA-512 DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bit entropy input and reseeded with a 256-bits long entropy input. Outputs of multiple GetEntropy() calls are concatenated to receive the entropy input length greater than 256 bits. The output is truncated to get the entropy input string which is not a multiple of 256. The operational environment on the ESV certificate is identical to the operating system described in this document, and the entropy source is implemented inside the cryptographic © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

boundary. Thus, the module is compliant with scenario 1 of IG 9.3.A. There are no maintenance requirements for the entropy source.

The module implements asymmetric key pair generation compliant with SP 800-133r2, as listed in the Security Function Implementations table in Section 2.6. When random values are required, they are directly obtained as output from the SP 800-90Ar1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2 (without XOR). Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized after processing the service.

The module implements shared secret computation methods as listed in the Security Function Implementations table in Section 2.6.

AES-GCM with internal IV generation in the approved mode is compliant with RFC 4106 and shall only be used in conjunction with the IPsec protocol. Diffie-Hellman shall only be used with the NVMe related protocol. No parts of the NVMe or IPSec protocols, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 11: Ports and Interfaces The logical interfaces are the APIs through which the applications request services. These logical interfaces are logically separated from each other by the API design and AF_ALG type socket message types. The module does not implement a control output interface. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

The module does not implement any authentication methods.

Table 12: Roles No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators.

d) d) © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

W,E D.L): G,E,Z G,E,Z D.L): G,E,Z D.L): G,E,Z D.L): G,W,E D.L): © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

G,W,E D.L): G,W,E W,E G,R G,E,Z ) © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

n n n © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

n Z D.L): Z Z D.L): Z D.L): Z D.L): Z D.L): Z © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Name

Descrip tion

Indicator

Inputs

Inputs

Output s

Security Functio ns

SSP Access D.L): Z - DH public key: Z - DH private key: Z - Interme diate key generati on value: Z

D.L): Z Table 13: Approved Services For the above table, the convention below applies when specifying the access permissions (types) that the service has for each SSP.

• Generate (G): The module generates or derives the SSP.
• Read (R): The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
• Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Zeroize (Z): The module zeroizes the SSP.

Table 14: Non-Approved Services © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

The module does not load external software or firmware. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

On system boot, the sha512hmac binary and libkcapi library are first integrity tested using the HMAC-SHA2-512 and HMAC-SHA2-256 algorithms (respectively) implemented by the module. Then, the kernel binary is integrity tested using the HMAC-SHA2-512 algorithm. These tests are all performed using a key hardcoded in the sha512hmac binary, by recomputing the MAC tags and verifying they are equal to the MAC tags specified in the .hmac file. Finally, the kernel crypto object files are loaded on start-up by the kernel binary and verified using RSA signature verification with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, SHA2-256, and a hardcoded 3072bit key. The signature is stored inside the kernel object file. If the signature verification fails, the integrity test is unsuccessful.

Integrity tests are performed as part of the pre-operational self-tests, which are executed when the module is initialized. The integrity tests can be invoked on demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module (i.e., rebooting the system), which will perform (among others) the software integrity tests. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable How Requirements are Satisfied: The operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented.

The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11.1. Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environments. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

The module is comprised of software only and therefore this section is not applicable. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

The module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanisms. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 15: Storage Areas The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs; SSPs in use by the module exist in destroyed when released by the appropriate zeroization function calls. Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods All data output is inhibited during zeroization. h © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

h 4, D.L) D.L) D.L) D.L) © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

h D.L) 6, 4, 6, 4, Table 18: SSP Table 1 © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2031. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until the tests are successfully completed. The module does not return control to the calling application until the tests are completed. If any of the self-tests fails, the module immediately transitions to the error state.

Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests The pre-operational software integrity tests are performed automatically when the module is powered on, before the module transitions into the operational state.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

n n © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

2.0 2.0 n n n n n n n © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

n n                  n n                  n n                  n n                  n n                  n n                  n n                  n © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the conditional self-tests. The module does not return control to the calling application until the tests are completed. If any of these tests fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.4).

Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

Table 24: Error States In the error state, the output interface is inhibited, and the module accepts no more inputs or requests (as the module is no longer running).

The software integrity tests, CASTs and entropy source start-up tests can be invoked on demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module. The PCTs can be invoked on demand by requesting the key pair generation service. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

The module is distributed as a part of the Rocky Linux 9 distribution, in the form of the kernel5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2.ciqfips.0.8.1, libkcapi-1.3.1-3.el9, and libkcapi-hmaccalc-1.3.1-3.el9 RPM packages. The module can achieve FIPS validated configuration by:

• Adding the fips=1 option to the kernel command line during the system installation. During the software selection stage, do not install any third-party software.
• Switching the system into the validated configuration after installation. Execute the “fips-mode-setup --enable” command. Restart the system. In both cases, the Crypto Officer must verify the system operates in the validated configuration by executing the “fips-mode-setup --check” command, which should output “FIPS mode is enabled.”

After installation of the RPM packages, the Crypto Officer must execute the “cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_name” command. The Crypto Officer must ensure that the proper name is listed in the output as follows: Rocky Linux 9 - Kernel Cryptographic API Then, the Crypto Officer must execute the “cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_version” and “rpm -qa | grep kcapi” commands. These commands must output the following (one line per output): $ cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_version rocky9.20250121 $ rpm -qa | grep kcapi libkcapi-hmaccalc-1.3.1-3.el9.x86_64 libkcapi-1.3.1-3.el9.x86_64

There is no non-administrator guidance.

© 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, the kernel5.14.0-284.30.1.el9_2.ciqfips.0.8.1, libkcapi-1.3.1-3.el9, and libkcapi-hmaccalc-1.3.1-3.el9 RPM packages can be uninstalled from the Rocky Linux 9 system. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks. © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

A Glossary and Abbreviations AES                     Advanced Encryption Standard API                     Application Programming Interface CAST                    Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test CAVP                    Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program CBC                     Cipher Block Chaining CBC-CS3                 Cipher Block Chaining with Ciphertext Stealing 3 CCM                     Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code CFB                     Cipher Feedback CKG                     Cryptographic Key Generation CMAC                    Cipher-based Message Authentication Code CMVP                    Cryptographic Module Validation Program CSP                     Critical Security Parameter CTR                     Counter DH                      Diffie-Hellman DRBG                    Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB                     Electronic Code Book FFC                     Finite Field Cryptography FIPS                    Federal Information Processing Standards GCM                     Galois Counter Mode GMAC                    Galois Counter Mode Message Authentication Code HMAC                    Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code IPsec                   Internet Protocol Security IG                      Implementation Guidance IV                      Initialization Vector KAS                     Key Agreement Scheme KAT                     Known Answer Test KW                      Key Wrap MAC                     Message Authentication Code NIST                    National Institute of Science and Technology OFB                     Output Feedback PAA                     Processor Algorithm Acceleration PAI                     Processor Algorithm Implementation PCT                     Pair-wise Consistency Test PSP                     Public Security Parameter RSA                     Rivest Shamir Adleman SHA                     Secure Hash Algorithm SSC                     Shared Secret Computation SSP                     Sensitive Security Parameter TOEPP                   Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter XTS                     XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

B References FIPS 140-3 Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules March 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3 FIPS 140-3 IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-modulevalidation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) August 2015 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4 FIPS 186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS) February 2023 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5 FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) November 2001; Updated May 2023 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.197-upd1 FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) July 2008 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.198-1 FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and ExtendableOutput Functions August 2015 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202 PKCS#1 PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 November 2016 https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8017 RFC 4106 The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) June 2005 https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC4106 SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques December 2001 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A SP 800-38A- Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Add Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode October 2010 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A-Add SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication May 2005; Updated October 2016 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38B SP 800-38C Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality May 2004; Updated July 2007 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38C SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC November 2007 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D SP 800-38E Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.

January 2010 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38E SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping December 2012 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38F SP 800-56Ar3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography April 2018 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3 SP 800-90Ar1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators June 2015 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1 SP 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation January 2018 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90B SP 800-131Ar2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths Marcy 2019 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2 SP 800-133r2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation June 2020 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-133r2 SP 800-140Br1 Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) Security Policy Requirements: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 and ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B November 2023 https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-140Br1 © 2025 Ctrl IQ, Inc., atsec information security.