FEITIAN ePass Token Cryptographic Module

Certificate

Derived Review-Risk Graph (review prompts, not findings)

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic review-risk graph for FEITIAN ePass Token Cryptographic Module
  %% Review prompts and evidence gaps, NOT vulnerability findings.
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery<br/>/ rollback (referenced in<br/>text)<br/><i>Update<br/>Recovery</i>"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface<br/>(referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output<br/>Unauth</i>"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime<br/>referenced (boundary<br/>membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i>"]
  end
  subgraph Inference["Derived inference"]
    I2["Possible only, trusted<br/>code is reachable through<br/>update and recovery paths."]
    I3["Possible only, some<br/>services may process input<br/>before, or without,<br/>operator authentication."]
    I6["Possible only, a<br/>runtime/OS is referenced,<br/>but its membership in the<br/>cryptographic boundary is<br/>not established."]
  end
  subgraph Risk["Reviewer question"]
    R2["Are update images<br/>authenticated before<br/>parsing, and are<br/>downgrade/rollback paths<br/>constrained?"]
    R3["Can unauthenticated<br/>services leak state,<br/>consume resources, or<br/>transition security state?"]
    R6["If the OS/runtime is<br/>in-boundary, could its<br/>CVEs be hidden by<br/>firmware-only versioning?"]
  end
  subgraph Evidence["Evidence needed to close"]
    E2["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>update image format ·<br/>signature-before-parse<br/>proof · anti-rollback /<br/>downgrade policy"]
    E3["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>pre-auth reachability<br/>matrix · rate limits and<br/>output redaction ·<br/>abuse-case tests"]
    E6["confirm the disclosure<br/>itself (keyword hit,<br/>context unverified) ·<br/>runtime identity and<br/>config · kernel/runtime<br/>hardening profile ·<br/>patch/backport manifest"]
  end
  C2 --> I2 --> R2 --> E2
  C3 --> I3 --> R3 --> E3
  C6 --> I6 --> R6 --> E6
  classDef clue fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef infer fill:#fff7e6,stroke:#b98500,color:#6b4e00;
  classDef risk fill:#fbe9e9,stroke:#b02a2a,color:#7a1f1f;
  classDef evidence fill:#e6f4ea,stroke:#1e7d34,color:#14532d;
  class C2,C3,C6 clue;
  class I2,I3,I6 infer;
  class R2,R3,R6 risk;
  class E2,E3,E6 evidence;

flowchart LR
  %% Deterministic clue tier for FEITIAN ePass Token Cryptographic Module
  %% confidence: high = structured record field; medium = structured but soft; low (dashed) = bare keyword hit, context unverified
  subgraph CMVP["CMVP-disclosed clues (deterministic)"]
    C2["[low] Firmware update / recovery / rollback (referenced in text)<br/><i>Update<br/>Recovery</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C3["[low] Self-test / status surface (referenced in text)<br/><i>Self-Test<br/>Status Output<br/>Unauth</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
    C6["[low] Operating system / runtime referenced (boundary membership not asserted)<br/><i>operating system<br/>application</i><br/>src: text:keyword"]
  end
  classDef clueHigh fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#2f6fb0,stroke-width:2px,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueMedium fill:#eef3f9,stroke:#6f7f91,color:#1f3a5f;
  classDef clueLow fill:#f7f7f7,stroke:#999,stroke-dasharray:4 4,color:#444;
  class C2,C3,C6 clueLow;

Security Policy, page by page

FEITIAN Technologies Co., Ltd. FEITIAN ePass Token Cryptographic Module Document Version: 1.1.0 Date: January 16, 2026

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the ePass token. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-

The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows: Table 1: Security Levels FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

2 – Cryptographic Module Specification

This FEITIAN ePass token module, hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module supports multiple identity authentication system frameworks such as PKI/OTP/FIDO, among which PKI includes three applications: ePass2003/ePassPIV/ePassOpenPGP. The OTP functional unit complies with OATH standards. The PIV functional unit meets the specifications NIST.SP.800-73-4. The OpenPGP functional unit is an ISO Smart Card Operating Systems.

Purpose and Use: The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated identity authentication product, the Module is intended to be used in E-mail encryption, system login, transaction protection, etc. Module Type: Hardware Module Embodiment: MultiChipEmbed Cryptographic Boundary: The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is a multi-chip embedded embodiment. The Module is a USB token containing FEITIAN owned FTCOS, which is embedded in a HSC32K2 with PAA Integrated Circuit (IC) chip and has been developed to support FEITIAN USB token. The Module is designed to provide strong authentication and identification and to support network login, secure online transactions, digital signatures, and sensitive data protection. Figure 1

• Module Boundary FEITIAN Technologies Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 2

• Block diagram FEITIAN Technologies Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Figure 3

• Module Appearance Model Description: There are two types, one without buttons and the other with buttons. In the above Figure 3, the top row (A2 models
• Blue and Purple) do not come with buttons, they are only used for ePass2003 products. All other models (K9, K40, A4B, K49, K50 and K28) have a button which can be used for all functional units.

The operator can correlate the module’s name and versioning information with the CMVP validation record by following the instructions in the FEITIAN ePass Token Cryptographic Module Administrator Guidance, page 31, Section 5.8 Get Device Info, #7 get version info. Tested Module Identification

• Hardware: FEITIAN ePass Token cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material
• May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware

The module does not exclude any components. Modes List and Description: Table 3: Modes List and Description The module only supports Approved mode. IG 2.4.C scenario 2) is applied to the module, i.e. A static code(9000 or 00) indicating the completion of service. The successful completion of a service is an implicit indicator for the use of an approved service.

Approved Algorithms: The Module implements the Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 4: Approved Algorithms Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: The Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed below. Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: N/A for this module. Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: N/A for this module. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The SFI table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements: -5): c -5): C.A] c FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

c -5): -5): FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

-5): -5): FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 6: Security Function Implementations

AES GCM IV Uniqueness FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 2 The IV is generated internally at its entirety randomly. The generation uses an Approved DRBG (Cert. #A4980) that is internal to the module’s boundary. The IV length shall be at least 96 bits (per SP 800-38D). KAS [56Ar3] - Per [IG] D.F Scenario 2 path (2), compliant key agreement scheme where testing is performed end-to-end for the shared secret computation and a KDF compliant with HKDF (2step KDF). The Module obtains the [FIPS140-3_IG] D.F required key agreement assurances [SP800-56Ar3] in accordance with Section 5.6.2.

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The scenario 1(a) in IG 9.3.A is applied to the module, the security strength of the DRBG seeded by the entropy source is 128-bit. According to table 4 of the ESV Public Use Document, to reach 128 bits of strength, at least 581 bits of random nonce are needed to seed the DRBG. A 640-bit nonce is used in the module, so the DRBG entropy strength is 128 bits. Table 7: Entropy Certificates The Module uses the following entropy sources: Table 8: Entropy Sources

For Key Generation, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.

Key Agreement Information For Key Agreement, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above. Key Transport Information For Key Transport, see Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 above.

The module does not support any industry protocols that would be of interest to this standard. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below. Table 9: Ports and Interfaces Note: The module does not support Control Output. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 10: Authentication Methods All authentication states are all stored in RAM, so they are cleared automatically once the module is powered down. Note: Authentication-PIN is an abstract noun that includes the PIN of ePass2003 unit, PIN/PUK of PIV unit, PIN of FIDO unit, AccessiCode of OTP unit, PGP User PIN(PW1)/ PGP Admin PIN(PW3) of OpenPGP unit. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Authentication-AuthKey is an abstract noun that includes the Device authenticate key of a universal service unit, the External Auth Key of an ePass2003 unit, and the PIV Authentication Key of a PIV unit.

The Module supports four distinct operator roles, User, Admin, Cryptographic Officer (CO) and Unauth. The CO role is responsible for device authentication, resetting applications and other roles' authentication data (User PINs, etc). The Admin role is responsible for configuring SSPs and managing User identities (such as unblock a User identity in the PIV application). The User role is responsible for performing cryptographic operations to utilize the module as an authenticator. The unauthenticated role can only access some non-operational SSP services, Such as Select functional unit, get a challenge, read non-security relevant information, self-tests, etc. The Module does not support a maintenance role. The Module does not support concurrent operators. The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module. Table 11: Roles FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below: The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

G s G G E E E s r V: Z FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Z Z Z FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Z FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Z Z :Z :Z FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Z s r s s s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

s s s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

E s E E E s E E P FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

s r E E E FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

G,E s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

s s s s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Z Z s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

s s V: G,E G,R,W FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

E G,E V: G,E E FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

s r G,R,E FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

s G FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Z s E E s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

V: G,Z G,E s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

E E V: E G,E s r s r s r s FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

s s :E : W,E FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

W,E s :E V: G,E FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

G,E s r :E :Z s r s r FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

NOTE: There is no External Software/Firmware Loaded. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s): Component 1: cryptographic binary Component 2: non-modifiable operating system - binary The firmware components are protected with the error detection code CRC-16. Calculate CRC-16 on code and constant data in flash, then compare the result with expected value, which is also part of preoperational self-test.

The operator can initiate integrity test on demand by restarting the module. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module has a non-modifiable operational environment at Level 3 under the FIPS 140-3 definitions therefore per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual Section 7.5 Partial validations and non-applicable areas this section is not applicable. Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module is made of a completely hardened, production-grade polycarbonate or metal. The colored polycarbonate or metal enclosure obscures a clear view of the hardware components within. A hard, non-malleable metal casing surrounds the USB connector. The casing is made of hard, production-grade, black, opaque plastic. The coloring of the Module obscures any visible writing on the PCB. The visible critical components within the Module are further covered to meet FIPS 140-3 level 3 physical security requirements. The HSC32K2 with PAA microcontroller is covered with a black, opaque, tamper-resistant, epoxy encapsulated, thus completely covering all critical cryptographic components from plain view. The USB connector located outside of the casing (in the case of the USB Token-A3) of the USB token is made of a hard, black, opaque, production grade plastic and prevents access to the rest of the USB token. Any attempt at removal or penetration of the enclosure has a high probability of causing serious damage to the Module and the hardware components within the enclosure, which will reveal clear tamper evidence. Removal of the metal surrounding the USB connector will result in physical damage of the USB connector and its associated pins, rendering the entire cryptographic module useless. If the USB connector is exposed, there is no power going to the USB token. Once power is removed from the cryptographic module, all plaintext keys and unprotected SSPs in RAM are zeroized.

The enclosure of the module is designed with anti-dismantle. After assembly, any attempt at tampering will leave visible damage on the enclosure. So, each time a user uses the module, you should first check the outer appearance of the module to make sure the module has not been tampered since last time use. In case user detects any tamper during inspection, user must stop using the module immediately and contact manufacturer. Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required Table 14: EFP/EFT Information FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures Notes: The module is hardness tested at the lowest and highest temperatures within the module's intended temperature range of operation. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

1) FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3 FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

D D FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

N/A FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

N/A FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

N/A FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 19: SSP Table 1 FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Name PIV RSA verification Public Key PIV User PIN PIV PUK PIN 2003 Internal Auth Key 2003 External Auth Key 2003 PIN 2003 PSO calculation key 2003 Unblock PIN 2003 RSA Private Key

Input - Output Output in plaintext (IO8) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1)

Storage CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted

Storage Duration

Zeroization Z6 Z6 Z6 Z3 Z3 Z3 Z3 Z3 Z3

Related SSPs PIV RSA Signature Private Key:Paired With KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by 2003 RSA Public Key:Paired With Managing Key:Encrypted by

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Name 2003 RSA Public Key 2003 ECDSA Private Key 2003 ECDSA Public Key OTP HMAC Seed Key OTP AccessCode PGP Admin PIN(PW3) PGP User PIN(PW1) PGP Resetting Code PGP Signature Private Key PGP Verification Public Key External Agreement ECC Public Key

Input - Output Output in plaintext (IO8) Output in plaintext (IO8) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Input encapsulated by KTS-Wrap SCP03(IO1) Output in plaintext (IO8) Input in plaintext (IO6)

Storage CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S4):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S3):Encrypted CHIPNVM(S6):Plaintext CHIPRAM(S1):Plaintext

Storage Duration

Zeroization Z3 Z3 Z3 Z1 Z8 Z4 Z4 Z4 Z4 Z4 Z2

Related SSPs 2003 RSA Private Key:Paired With Managing Key:Encrypted by 2003 ECDSA Public Key:Paired With 2003 ECDSA Private Key:Paired With Managing Key:Encrypted by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by KSenc:Unwrapped by KSmac:Unwrapped by Managing Key:Encrypted by PGP Verification Public Key:Paired With PGP Signature Private Key:Paired With FIDO Agreement ECC Private Key:Used With

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Name

Input - Output

Storage

Storage Duration

Zeroization

Related SSPs FIDO Agreement sharedSecret:Derives

Table 20: SSP Table 2 FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2031. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.

The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests

Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information The condition of initiating Periodic Self-Test is to execute every 1000 services. Once every 1000 services being executed, the periodic self-test function will call Pre-Operational Self-Tests and Conditional Self-Tests. Self-test failures are indicated to the user through LED status and service return status. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

All self-tests, except for the continuous health tests, can be invoked on demand by restarting the module. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

Installation and Initialization: The following steps must be performed in order to securely install, initialize, and start up the ePass Token cryptographic module in the FIPS 140-3 Approved mode of operation. The steps for the CO to enter the module and change the default password gain authorized access to the module. The module is setup at manufacturing and delivered to the CO in approved mode. Delivery: The following steps must be performed in order to securely deliver the ePass Token cryptographic module to the authorized operator:

1. Set the required keys in a secure factory environment
2. Complete packaging and user manual
3. Shipping the modules to the final customer. For each shipment, our factory will use the courier agreed with customer, such as FedEx or DHL. Our factory will inform customer in advance with the shipment info by email. When the goods arriving in customer site, the customer will first check the goods according to the shipment info they received, and sign for acceptance.
4. The final customer check the module information according to administrator manual.

Refer to FEITIAN ePass Token Cryptographic Module Administrator Guidance.docx, which will be provided to the issuer through secure communications.

Refer to FEITIAN ePass Token Cryptographic Module Non-Administrator Guidance.docx, which will be provided to the issuer through secure communications.

FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
13. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
14. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
15. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.

The module does not require any maintenance requirements

Administrator SHALL invoke Terminate token service after authentication to switch device into the terminated state as a result, all CSPs are cleared, and all services are not available anymore. The device shall be destroyed. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks. FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

References and Definitions The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy. Table 26 References * FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).

* Table 27 Acronyms and Definitions FEITIAN Technologies Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).